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To the memory of my father 
 
One cannot speak about the indispensability of the soul without prefacing 
some clarifications regarding the relevant notion of dispensability. First, 
obviously, something is dispensable if, and only if, it is not needed. Sec-
ond, equally obviously, being needed always means being needed for some 
purpose or other. It follows that the notion of dispensability is a relative 
notion, a notion relative to purposes. For something, X, may not be needed 
for certain purposes, but it may be needed for others; accordingly, X may 
be dispensable relative to some purposes, and indispensable relative to oth-
ers. 
The purposes to which I am limiting myself in this paper are theoretical 
purposes, that is: purposes of description and explanation in the widest 
sense, and my notion of dispensability is relative to these purposes. Thus, 
when the phrase “X is indispensable (respectively: dispensable)” occurs in 
this paper, then, in the last analysis, it should be taken to mean that X is 
needed (respectively: not needed) for purposes of description and explana-
tion (broadly conceived). It is important to keep in mind that I take theo-
retical purposes to include not only scientific purposes but also philosophi-
cal and theological ones. It is obvious to me that purposes of description 
and explanation can be found not only in science but also in philosophy 
and theology. 
The thesis I would like to defend in this paper is the indispensability of 
the soul; that is, speaking precisely, I am asserting that the existence of 
souls is needed for purposes of description and explanation. In support of 
this assertion, I am going to adduce several arguments. There is an impor-
tant caveat: even if it is shown that the existence of souls is needed for 
purposes of description and explanation, it does not follow logically that 
souls do in fact exist. This conclusion is merely made highly probable, for 
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epistemological optimists, by the fact – if it is a fact – that the existence of 
souls is needed for purposes of description and explanation. 
The following analogy is meant to illustrate this point. Everybody 
knowledgeable in physics these days accepts that the existence of quarks is 
needed for purposes of description and explanation. But this indispensabil-
ity of the existence of quarks does not logically entail the existence of 
quarks. Most people will, indeed, take the step from asserting the former to 
asserting the latter. They are epistemological optimists. If they are philoso-
phers of science or familiar with this area of philosophy, such people call 
themselves “realists.” Regarding their attitude towards the existence of 
quarks, realists can certainly not be considered irrational. 
But empiricists, too, cannot be considered irrational regarding their own 
attitude towards this matter. Empiricists, being epistemological pessimists, 
will remain agnostics about the existence of quarks, even if they agree that 
the existence of such things is needed for purposes of description and ex-
planation. In adopting this attitude, empiricists are not committing a logical 
mistake or other lapse of rationality. They are merely acting on stricter 
standards of rationality. They are refusing to take what, in their eyes, is a 
blind and entirely unnecessary leap of faith. 
In my view, the old dispute between realists and empiricists whether or 
not to accept the existence of so-called “theoretical entities” on the grounds 
of indispensability cannot be rationally decided. The reason for this is that 
it is not a rationally decidable question whether we, when inferring exist-
ence, should accept stricter or less strict standards of rationality. This ques-
tion concerning standards of rationality is not itself rationally decidable; it 
is a question of basic stance. 
I, for my part, am a realist not only regarding quarks but also regarding 
those other, rather different theoretical entities: souls. I do think that the 
indispensability of the existence of souls is good reason for accepting the 
existence of souls. The only trouble is that hardly any philosopher or scien-
tist these days believes that the existence of souls is indispensable, that is: 
really needed for theoretical purposes, the purposes of description and ex-
planation. This is not fair, I believe – worse: it is not rational. 
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1. What Is a Soul? 
 
Before defining the concept of a soul, it is necessary to define the concept 
of a substance. For soul is a certain type of substance. Here is my defini-
tion of substance: 
 
A substance is an individual that (1) exists at several moments of 
time, and (2) is wholly present – that is, present with all the parts it 
has at the moment1 – at each moment at which it exists, and that (3) 
is capable (simpliciter: at least at some time) of consciousness or 
agency. 
 
It is necessary to add several comments to this definition of substance: 
 
- According to it, substances are individuals. But not all individuals are 
substances. Individuals with merely a momentary existence, or individuals 
that are not wholly present at some moment at which they exist, or indi-
viduals which are neither capable of consciousness nor of agency, are not 
substances. 
- In the given definition of substance, the element of independent exist-
ence is lacking, in spite of the fact that this element has traditionally been 
included in the definition of substance. The reason for omitting it is that 
independent existence is a relative notion – a notion which is obscure as 
long as it has not been clearly said of what an independently existing thing 
is to be independent. Everything is ontologically dependent on something, 
and independent of other things. It turns out to be surprisingly difficult to 
determine what it is that a substance exists independently of, and to deter-
mine it in such a manner that it is neither the case that entities are counted 
as substances that one would definitely not regard as such, nor the case that 
entities are not counted as substances that one would definitely regard as 
such. 
- The given definition of substance does not include the element of 
bearer of properties, in spite of the fact that this element has traditionally 
                                       
1  If it has certain parts in a non-temporal way: in a way that is not dependent on time, 
then these parts are counted as parts that it has at all moments. 
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been included in the definition of substance. But it would have been point-
less to include it, because everything has properties and is, therefore, a 
bearer of properties. 
- The given definition of substance excludes everything that is essen-
tially lifeless from being a substance. For everything that is essentially life-
less is (at all times) incapable of consciousness and incapable of agency, 
and therefore, according to definition, it is not a substance. 
- The given definition of substance excludes from being a substance 
everything that exists only at isolated moments. Something that exists, 
first, at the moment t, and after t does not exist until moment t´, at which it 
exists again, and after t´ does not exist until moment t´´, at which it exists 
again, and so on, exclusively in this manner, is not a substance, since, be-
cause of its manner of existence, it is (at all times) incapable of conscious-
ness and agency. For the capability of consciousness (at any time) requires 
that its subject exist uninterruptedly (at that time),2 and it is the same with 
the capability of agency. (In consequence, condition (3) of the definition of 
substance can be seen to imply condition (1).) 
 
Given the concept of substance, as defined above, we can define the fol-
lowing subsidiary concepts: 
 
A potential subject of action at t is a substance which is at t capable 
of agency. 
An actual subject of action at t is a substance which acts at t. 
A potential subject of consciousness at t is a substance that is at t ca-
pable of consciousness. 
An actual subject of consciousness at t is a substance which is con-
scious at t. 
 
At this point, it should be noted that not only “x acts at t” and “x is con-
scious at t” but also “x is at t capable of agency” and “x is at t capable of 
consciousness” entail “x exists at t.” Continuing the sequence of defini-
tions, we finally have: 
                                       
2  Something, x, exists uninterruptedly at a time t if, and only if, there is a time t´ be-
fore or after t such that at all times between t and t´ (including t and t´) x exists. 
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A subject of action at t (simpliciter) is a substance which is either a 
potential or an actual subject of action at t, in other words (since ac-
tual entails potential): being a subject of action at t amounts to being 
a potential subject of action at t. (Note that potential is understood in 
such a way as not to preclude actual.) 
A subject of consciousness at t (simpliciter) is a substance which is 
either a potential or an actual subject of consciousness at t, in other 
words: being a subject of consciousness at t amounts to being a po-
tential subject of consciousness at t. 
 
After these preparations we are ready to move on to the definition of 
soul. The primary concept of soul is a relational, and time-dependent, con-
cept. It is captured by the following definition: 
 
x is a soul of y at t iff (1) y is a body, (2) x is at t a subject of action 
or a subject of consciousness, and (3) x is united to y at t. 
 
Given the relational and time-dependent concept of soul, it is easy to de-
fine the non-relational and time-independent concept: 
 
x is a soul iff x is a soul of something at some time. 
 
2. Questions Surrounding the Concept of Soul 
 
Obviously, it is the relational and time-dependent concept of soul that 
needs further attention. Its definition contains three elements, each of 
which raises more or less far-reaching questions: 
 
- What is a body? – One might answer this question very generally and 
unspecifically by saying simply: a body is a material object. But we can 
also answer it in the light of taking into account the minimal condition that 
a material object must fulfill if a subject of action or subject of conscious-
ness is to be united to it. In this light, it is fitting to define a body as a mate-
rial object whose time of existence is neither momentary nor interrupted, 
and which is wholly present at each moment at which it exists. It should be 
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noted that this definition of body does not quite subsume the concept of 
body under the concept of substance: although ingredients (1) and (2) of 
the definition of substance are present, ingredient (3) is not. Thus the sug-
gested definition of body leaves it open whether a body is a substance or 
not. 
- What is the relationship between being a subject of action and being a 
subject of consciousness? – Purely from the logical or conceptual point of 
view, a substance, it seems, may well be a subject of action at a time with-
out being a subject of consciousness at that time, and also a subject of con-
sciousness at a time without being a subject of action at that time. How-
ever, subjects of action incapable of consciousness and subjects of con-
sciousness incapable of action do not seem to be normal cases of sub-
stances, and in fact it is rather doubtful whether there are any such cases at 
any time. One could even make a case for holding that, contrary to first 
impression, every subject of action must, for purely conceptual reasons, be 
a subject of consciousness. It is, therefore, very useful to distinguish a ri-
cher concept of soul from the basic concept defined above: 
 
x is a sentient soul of y at t iff (1) y is a body, (2) x is at t a subject of 
action and a subject of consciousness, and (3) x is united to y at t. 
 
x is a sentient soul iff x is a sentient soul of something at some time. 
 
- What is the basic ontological character of being a subject of action, 
respectively a subject of consciousness? – In part, this question is answered 
by the definitions presented above, but only in part. There is, of course, 
much more to say. Mainly, it must be clarified what is the nature of action 
and the nature of consciousness. I cannot go into this here, but I have 
treated the nature of action and of consciousness at considerable length in 
my book The Two Sides of Being.3 One result, however, must be stated 
here: due to the nature of consciousness, only nonphysical substances can 
be subjects of consciousness; a fortiori, only nonphysical substances can be 
subjects of action and consciousness together. Hence: if something is a 
sentient soul of anything at any time, then it is nonphysical. 
                                       
3  Meixner (2004). 
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- What is the nature of the unification of x to y if x is at t a soul of y? – 
This, of course, is an absolutely crucial question. Many philosophers re-
gard the presumed impossibility of answering it – in particular, if a soul is 
to be a nonphysical individual – as the main obstacle to taking the concept 
of soul seriously. My own position is that a soul that is united to a body at 
a time is united to that body in virtue of arising from it at that time due to 
psychophysical natural laws, because that body fulfills certain physical 
conditions at that time. Thus the ensouledness of a body is law-induced, 
given specific physical conditions the body fulfills; in other words, certain 
physical conditions, when fulfilled by a body, are nomologically sufficient 
for bringing forth a soul from that body. The unification of a soul to a body 
at a time consists precisely in its being brought forth from the body at that 
time due to natural laws. Moreover, the soul-inducing natural laws are of 
such a kind that no more than one soul can arise from a body that fulfills 
the fitting physical conditions: a soul of a body is always its (single) soul. 
Since natural laws – laws of nature – are metaphysically contingent, the 
unification of a soul to a body is itself metaphysically contingent; there is 
no metaphysical necessity for it, but only a nomological one. There is no 
metaphysical absurdity in the proposition that a body suited for having a 
soul has none, just as there is no metaphysical absurdity in the proposition 
that a body exerts no gravitational force. Indeed, the unification of a soul to 
a body is metaphysically contingent in a way that is strictly analogous to 
the way in which the unification of the gravitational force of a body to that 
body is metaphysically contingent: the metaphysically contingent connec-
tion between the two is just as close, and it is in the same degree compre-
hensible and explicable. And, in both cases, asking for more comprehensi-
bility and greater explicability than can be provided on the basis of natural 
laws is asking for the impossible. Apart from the fact that the soul of a bo-
dy is a substance while the body’s gravitational force is not, the element of 
difference in this analogy is, of course, that the connection between body 
and soul is constituted by psychophysical laws, while for constituting the 
connection between body and gravitational force purely physical laws suf-
fice. But the existence of psychophysical natural laws is no absurdity – 
quite on the contrary. Hence the existence of the body-soul connection, as 
described, is no absurdity either – quite on the contrary. 
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There are two important follow-up questions to the question just treated, 
which questions also relate to the above definition of soul, though only in-
directly: 
 
- How did the body-soul connection come into the world? – This ques-
tion, too, is often regarded as an embarrassment for body-soul theories. It 
isn’t. The body-soul connection is widespread throughout the kingdom of 
living beings; it came about as the result of evolution. This means three 
things: (1) the natural laws are such that the body-soul connection is nomo-
logically possible; (2) in the course of natural history, physical conditions 
turned out to be such that the body-soul connection was initially produced, 
i.e., nomologically necessitated; (3) physical conditions having been, for 
millions of years, the way they have as a matter of fact been, the body-soul 
connection has been biologically advantageous for millions of years, and 
therefore it could not only maintain itself, but also become quite common 
and develop, in the course of time, from primitive beginnings to higher 
forms. Today, certainly all animals with a brain have a more or less highly 
developed sentient soul: a nonphysical subject of action and consciousness 
united to their respective bodies. It is a safe guess that the evolution of the 
sentient soul is nomologically parallel to, and therefore coeval with, the 
evolution of the brain. 
- What is the biological advantage of having a sentient soul? – It is hard 
to say what would be the biological advantage of having a soul if it were 
not sentient. I, therefore, merely address the question of what is the biolo-
gical advantage of having a sentient soul. Having a sentient soul is a di-
stinctive biological advantage – a survival asset – only if there is conside-
rable room for other responses of a living organism to its environment than 
mechanical reactions and chance movements; in other words, only if there 
is considerable room for decision-based physical action. There is consider-
able room for decision-based physical action only if there is considerable 
indetermination in the physical macro-world. Thus, the existence of consi-
derable indetermination in the physical macro-world is a condition that 
must be fulfilled if having a sentient soul is to be a survival asset. I cannot 
go into this here, but I do not believe that there are any good reasons 
against this condition being fulfilled; indeed, I take the obviousness of the 
fact that the having of a sentient soul is a survival asset as evidence for its 
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being fulfilled.4 But what, precisely, is the nature of the biological advan-
tage of having a sentient soul? Mechanical reactions are necessitated by the 
antecedent physical state of the world (mainly, by the antecedent physical 
state of the organism and its immediate environment), whereas chance mo-
vements happen strictly by chance. Decision-based physical actions, ho-
wever, are neither necessitated by the antecedent physical state of the 
world nor do they happen by chance. Like the ontological (not merely epi-
stemic) chanciness of the physical events that happen by chance, a decisi-
on-based physical action requires physical indetermination. But unlike on-
tological chance, which is blind and uncaused (i.e., without sufficient cau-
se), a decision-based action is caused and guided by information. A decisi-
on-based physical action of a living organism with a sentient soul is, at le-
ast in part, non-redundantly caused by the organism’s subject of action and 
consciousness: precisely by the organism’s sentient soul. In doing so, the 
organism’s sentient soul fills a lacuna of physical indeterminacy that is left 
open by mechanical determination, and it does so, on the whole, with much 
greater advantage to the organism than could be reached by any mere 
chance generator (which, prima facie, might be thought to serve the same 
purpose). For the sentient soul of an organism acts informed by the con-
sciousness of which it is the subject (but not determined by that conscious-
ness), and with a naturally given very strong overall intention of securing 
the survival, and promoting the welfare, of the organism of which it is the 
sentient soul. It acts, moreover, with at least rudimentary rationality in 
matching action to information and intention. In a nutshell: given consider-
able indetermination in the physical macro-world, it is clearly to the advan-
tage of a living organism to be equipped with a decision-maker in the 
proper sense of the word: a subject of action and consciousness which 
makes, in the light of consciousness, decisions that lead to physical actions 
intended to be of service to the organism (which often enough they are in 
fact, certainly more so than would be the “actions” originating from a mere 
chance generator). It is not unimportant to add (1) that the actions of a sen-
tient soul neither replace the mechanical reactions of its organism, nor oc-
cur independently of them (rather, the former occur on top of the latter and 
interwoven with them); and (2) that the connection between living organ-
                                       
4  See Meixner (2004); (2005). 
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ism and sentient soul displays many degrees of development, from the very 
primitive that can be found, say, in insects, to the very sophisticated that 
can be found in human beings. 
 
3. The Indispensability of the Soul for Science 
 
Most philosophers today hold that the assumption of the existence of phy-
sically active sentient souls is so far from being indispensable for science 
as to be scientifically impossible – that is, impossible given what science 
tells us is true about the world. (And if we had to scratch physically active 
sentient souls, then it certainly seems we might as well forget about the 
entire notion of soul.) On closer inspection, it turns out that the existence 
of physically active sentient souls is not so much incompatible with sci-
ence, specifically with physics, but with physicalism, which is not physics 
but a certain kind of metaphysics: the modern form of materialism. One of 
the tenets of physicalism is this: what causes something physical must it-
self be physical. It is this tenet which alone truly deserves to be called “the 
Principle of Causal Closure (of the Physical World).” If it were true, then a 
subject of action and consciousness that brings about physical effects 
couldn’t exist, whether it be united to a body or not. For, as has been said 
above, a subject of action and consciousness is bound to be a nonphysical 
entity. But is there any unconditional rational obligation to believe that the 
Principle of Causal Closure just stated is true? It is neither conceptually 
true nor in any way self-evident, nor is it a logical consequence of the ac-
cepted laws of physics,5 nor is it a postulate that we must believe in if phy-
sical science is to flourish. It is what it is: a metaphysical principle that we 
are under no rational obligation to believe in – unless, of course, we have 
already committed ourselves to the metaphysical position of physicalism. 
But even from the purely scientific point of view (let alone from the 
metaphysical), to commit oneself to physicalism is not a recommendable 
step to take. Experience is the indispensable basis of scientific knowledge, 
and there is not only experience of the outer, physical world: straight expe-
rience, but also experience of the inner world: reflective experience. But 
                                       
5  Regarding this latter point, see Meixner (2002). 
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reflective experience reveals, as its intentional objects (that is, as its objects 
of intentionality), entities that are very different from the intentional ob-
jects of straight experience. Sensations, emotions, perceptions, and 
thoughts, for example, are very much unlike physical entities: the intentio-
nal objects of straight experience. If we take the intentional objects of re-
flective experience broadly at face value – that is, if we do not deny their 
existence, nor believe that they exist all right, but are totally different from 
the way they appear to be in reflective experience –, then the conclusion is 
unavoidable that the intentional objects of reflective experience are 
nonphysical entities. Take a physical illusion: a perception belonging to 
straight experience but with a nonexistent intentional object, say, a percep-
tion of a continuously moving dot of light, whereas in reality there are only 
very brief single flashes of light arranged in a line, following very quickly 
one upon the other. Where in the physical world would this perception fit 
in – itself, taken as it is, and not replaced by something it is not? Of what 
could it be a spatiotemporal part? – Evidently, of nothing. Or take my 
dream-experience, while lying motionless in bed in dark night, eyes shut, 
of being a child again and running over a sunny meadow. Of what could 
that experience – itself, taken as it is, and not replaced by something it is 
not – be a spatiotemporal part? Evidently, of nothing. But it must be a spa-
tiotemporal part of the physical world if it is to belong to the physical 
world at all. 
Physicalists, of course, refuse to accept the teachings of reflective expe-
rience. Physicalists either deny that its intentional objects exist (this is done 
by the so-called eliminative materialists), or they believe that these objects 
are totally different from the way they appear to be (this is done by those 
who believe in the so-called identity theories, or in the various forms of 
materialist reductionism). But is this the proper scientific spirit: turning 
away from the phenomena, closing one’s eyes to them and their nature in 
order to maintain a metaphysical tenet, namely, that everything existing is 
physical? How very different is the attitude of the philosopher Edmund 
Husserl, who proposed a science of the phenomena (meaning by this pre-
cisely the intentional objects of reflective experience), a science as differ-
ent from all physical sciences as the phenomena are different from all 
physical entities. 
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Husserl very clearly recognized that the phenomena – the intentional ob-
jects of reflective experience, from the most complex to the simplest – all 
have something in common,6 something that is intrinsic to them, and that 
all the intentional objects of straight experience lack entirely. This is the 
directedness of the phenomena to the (appropriate) self, or their forness, as 
I call it.7 All of them are for a self, which, in each case, is itself a consti-
tuent of the respective phenomenon, and as nonphysical as the phenome-
non, but not literally a part of it. This forness, it is important to note, is not 
the intentional relation that is present in reflective experience, but a rela-
tion that is present in the intentional objects of reflective experience. All of 
these objects have, as it were, an address written on them: they are infor-
mation, information that is in each case intrinsically directed to someone: 
to the subject of consciousness. An intense bodily pain, for example, is in-
trinsically directed to a certain subject of consciousness, appealing urgently 
to this same subject to bring about, as the subject of agency it also is, ef-
fects in the physical world that lead to withdrawal from, or removal of, a 
certain damaging influence on the organism (namely, on the organism to 
which the subject of consciousness and agency belongs), in the only way it 
can do so: by effecting organismic change. 
There is, therefore, empirical evidence – evidence from reflective ex-
perience, and it is intersubjective and universal evidence – for the existence 
of nonphysical entities which are at once subjects of action and conscious-
ness, which are, moreover, each united to a particular body and causally 
effective in the physical world. In short, there is empirical evidence for the 
existence of nonphysical but physically effective sentient souls. In the pre-
vious section, it has, moreover, already been said which is the biological 
function for sentient souls that connects naturally with this empirical evi-
dence: we have seen that physically effective sentient souls have a job to 
do in the economy of the evolution of organisms – if only there is consid-
erable indetermination in the physical macro-world. In the light of these 
considerations, the indispensability of the soul – that is, the indispensability 
of the existence of souls for theoretical purposes, in particular for purposes 
of scientific description and explanation – looms large. 
                                       
6  Husserl, Erste Philosophie, part I, p. 120. 
7  Meixner (2005). 
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Physicalists, of course, deny the evidence on the basis of which a scien-
tific role for sentient souls can be established. But they do so, as we have 
also seen, on grounds that prove to be of a nonscientific sort when submit-
ted to an impartial scrutiny. 
 
4. The Indispensability of the Soul for the Christian Faith 
 
There is not only a substantial scientific role for the existence of souls, 
there is also a religious one. I will now address this religious role. The reli-
gious perspective can certainly not lead to the same degree of intersubjec-
tive assent as the scientific one, but whoever find themselves believing in 
what is stated in the Apostolic Creed, had better also take the religious per-
spective into account, in addition to the scientific one. 
The resurrection of the dead is one of the central Christian doctrines. 
But what exactly does resurrection consist in, and how could it occur?, 
leaving quite aside the question whether it does in fact occur. An occur-
rence of resurrection would, of course, be absolutely miraculous. But that 
need not ail the believing Christian, who, after all, believes in the Father 
Almighty, Creator of Heaven and Earth, and therefore also creator of all 
the laws of nature, which, in consequence, will be bound to hold precisely 
to the extent that He has eternally decreed them to hold. What a believing 
Christian needs to worry about is whether resurrection is even in the broa-
dest sense possible, and in particular resurrection according to the classical 
account. The classical account of resurrection, which has been accepted for 
two thousand years, can be stated as follows: 
 
An entity which was at one time the sentient soul of a human body X, 
forming together with it a complete living human being, and which 
has existed all the time since then, but has not been the soul of any-
thing for some time, is united to a human body Y (of superior quality, 
and in many respects similar to X), forming together with it that same 
complete human being who once lived, and who is now, on the Last 
Day, living again. 
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Clearly, the existence of sentient souls is essential if the classical account 
of resurrection is to be true. Materialists, who do not believe in the exist-
ence of sentient souls (since sentient souls are bound to be nonphysical en-
tities), are, therefore, not able to accept the classical account of resurrection 
as true. Some restricted materialists – who are materialists only with re-
gard to created entities, or even only with regard to human beings and 
other animals – believe themselves to be Christians nonetheless. A promi-
nent example is the American philosopher Peter van Inwagen. Obviously, a 
Christian materialist must believe in the truth of an account of resurrection 
which is different from the classical account. Here is this account: 
 
A human body which was at one time a complete living human be-
ing, and which has existed all the time since then, but has not been 
alive for some time8 (and – likely enough – has existed for some time 
only in a rudimentary form: as a skeleton, say), is reconstituted (in a 
superior form) to be that same complete human being who once 
lived, and who is now, on the Last Day, living again. 
 
Note that both the classical and the materialist account of resurrection have 
a crucial structural element in common: an entity that exists continuously 
in the time-interval between the first life of the human being and his or her 
second life acquired at the resurrection, whose function it is to guarantee 
that the resurrected human being is numerically the same human being as 
the human being that once lived. Call this entity the continuous link. In the 
classical account, the continuous link is the entity which was once the soul 
of a certain human body, constituting together with it a certain living hu-
man being; in the materialist account, the continuous link is that human 
body itself, the human body which was once a certain living human being. 
                                       
8  Note that the existence of a human body does not entail its being alive: a human 
body can exist without being alive. But the existence of a human being does indeed 
entail his or her being alive. This fact, however, does not entail dualism regarding 
human beings (according to which human beings are something else than human 
bodies), since also materialists (according to whom all human beings are human 
bodies) can allow, in consistency with the described conceptual fact, that not all 
human bodies are human beings, but only those human bodies that fulfill some ex-
tra conditions (physical conditions, of course): if a human body exists and fulfills 
these extra conditions, then it is alive. 
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Before we come to the main question – the one that is suggested by this 
juxtaposition of two conceptions of the continuous link – two other ques-
tions must be addressed: 
 
(1) Wouldn’t the sum of all atoms in a human body, at some time when 
it was alive, do as well as the continuous link for the materialist account of 
resurrection? – No. There is the well-known problem that any sum of at-
oms that were at a certain time part of a living human body may, in the 
course of time, be partly or even entirely identical with the sum of atoms in 
another living human body at another time. The deeper trouble is that a liv-
ing human body does not consist of the same atoms at all times. It is not 
even the case that at least some atoms are part of it at all times. In fact, it is 
entirely accidental which individual atoms a body consists of at any time. 
Then, which sum of atoms in that body at what time of its life is to be the 
relevant sum of atoms, that is, the one constituting the continuous link? 
Every answer to this question seems more or less arbitrary and accidental, 
whereas the identity of a human being at one time with a human being at 
another time is not in any way arbitrary and accidental. The difficulty can 
be effectively dramatized. In doing so, I let a thought-experiment of Peter 
van Inwagen’s9 refer to the author of the present paper (instead of having it 
refer, as it originally does, to Peter van Inwagen). The atoms in the body of 
ten-year-old Uwe Meixner are not the atoms in the body of forty-year-old 
Uwe Meixner. Thus, if the materialist account of resurrection were correct 
and the continuous link required by it were just a sum of atoms that once 
constituted the living body of the human being who is to be resurrected, 
then, unless God made a more or less arbitrary choice, He would have to 
resurrect two Uwe Meixners by putting the atoms together again in the way 
they once were, one Uwe Meixner corresponding to the ten-year-old, and 
another corresponding to the forty-year-old. Imagine the two at the resur-
rection, standing opposite to each other, each claiming with equal justifica-
tion that he is Uwe Meixner. Under the presuppositions made, there is no 
possibility whatever to resolve their conflict. 
 
                                       
9  See van Inwagen (1997), 245. 
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(2) Can we not do without any continuous link in an account of resur-
rection? – The answer is brief: it may perhaps be logically possible that, 
after an interval of nonexistence, the same human being that was once 
alive is alive again without there being any continuous link between the 
earlier existence and the subsequent one; but if this is a logical possibility, 
then it certainly seems to be a logical possibility we cannot well under-
stand. Thus, no philosophically satisfactory account of resurrection can do 
without the continuous link. 
 
Which of the two previously stated accounts of resurrection, then, has 
the more acceptable conception regarding the continuous link? – It is easily 
seen that the materialist account is in deep trouble. This account requires 
that a human body which was once a complete living human being exist 
the entire time until the resurrection of that same human being. Therefore: 
if the materialist account of resurrection is maintained, then – given plausi-
ble assumptions about the time that still remains until the resurrection, and 
about the continuation, during that time, of the processes universally at 
work in the physical world – the conclusion appears to be inescapable that 
no human being who once lived will ever be resurrected. If the materialist 
account of resurrection is maintained, then – even independently of the 
mentioned plausible assumptions – it seems certain that some human 
beings who once lived will never be resurrected. Consider a woman of Hi-
roshima standing on August 6, 1945, at 8:15 a. m. local time on ground ze-
ro of the nuclear blast occurring on August 6, 1945. It seems undeniable 
that the body of this woman was annihilated and that it does no longer ex-
ist, not even in a rudimentary form. Hence, according to the materialist ac-
count of resurrection, she cannot be resurrected; for, from the materialist 
point of view, there is no continuous link from her former life to her resur-
rected life. Her resurrection is, therefore, excluded. 
The only way out for Christian materialists is this: they must take refuge 
to the assumption that, contrary to all appearances and contrary to all hu-
man knowledge, the body of that woman (or at least a part of it that allows 
unique reconstruction) is preserved and does continue to exist.10 The as-
sumption is desperate, and has nothing to recommend it, except, of course, 
                                       
10  Cf. van Inwagen (1997), 246. 
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that it allows the Christian materialists’ account of resurrection to escape 
refutation – refutation by what they, like all Christians, take to be a fact of 
the future: the resurrection of the dead, that is, the resurrection of all the 
dead. 
In contrast: the continued existence of a subject of action and con-
sciousness that was once the sentient soul of a human body and consti-
tuted, together with that body, a living human being – this continued exist-
ence even after the death of that human being is, unquestionably, a miracle 
(that is, an exception to the laws of nature11), a miracle of a similar order 
as, say, the presence of a gravitational force without the presence of matter. 
But the classical scenario of how it is possible that the hand of God fulfill 
His promise of resurrection is, in spite of its miraculous nature, far more 
likely than the scenario advocated by Christian materialists. According to 
Christian materialists, there must be a place where God keeps those human 
bodies, or uniquely reconstructible parts of them, continuously in existence 
until the time of the resurrection which, to all appearances, were annihila-
ted, that is, subjected to forces that reduced them to completely disconnec-
ted collections of atoms and molecules, be it in an instant or in the course 
of millions of years.12 But how do those human parts get to that place, to 
that space beyond space? How do they get there, in particular, without a 
violation of the law of the preservation of matter-energy? Apparently, the 
only way how is this: God, miraculously and in an instant, replaces the 
human part which is to be preserved by an exact copy of it. The original is 
                                       
11  A miracle cannot be defined as a counter-instance to the laws of nature. Otherwise, 
there could not be any miracles – for conceptual reasons: since laws of nature are, 
by definition, obtaining general facts, they cannot have any counter-instances. But 
they can have exceptions: there can be real events which the laws of nature in an 
entirely natural, but counterfactual, extension of their scope would have excluded 
from happening, but which are, in fact, themselves excluded from the factual scope 
of the laws of nature. 
12  And He must eventually keep there the body of every human being that ever ex-
isted. For what will be the fate of a human body if it remains here on earth? The dy-
ing sun will eventually expand and make a glowing furnace out of the earth once 
again. In that furnace, each and every stable structure, if significantly above the 
atomic level, will be obliterated. 
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spirited away – another utterly miraculous transaction –, whereas the copy 
that replaces it, and the rest of the body, is given to complete destruction.13 
In view of this scenario, which is not only miraculous but also smacks 
of absurdity, one may well ask: what could make one prefer the materialist 
account of resurrection to the classical account? It is very clear, I believe, 
that the human body just isn’t the right candidate for being the continuous 
link between the former life of a human being and his or her resurrected 
life. The classical account has a far better candidate for that role. But the 
classical account also has the misfortune of being a dualistic account, and 
dualism makes modern thinkers recoil in horror – even many who are 
Christians. 
This frightened reaction is unwarranted. There are no good scientific 
reasons against dualism (see Section 314), nor are their good theological 
reasons against dualism if dualism is correctly understood. Dualism, as 
here understood, is obviously psychophysical dualism. Dualism of that 
kind does no require one to accept a dualistic religion, like Zoroastrianism 
or Manichaeism. It does not require one to adopt a disdainful attitude 
towards the physical creation, and it does not require one to adopt such an 
attitude towards one’s own body. Psychophysical dualism, moreover, must 
not be confused with the peculiar monism of the Platonistic tradition, 
according to which human beings are identified with their souls. Quite on 
the contrary, according to psychophysical dualism, human beings are 
neither mere subjects of action and consciousness, nor mere bodies; they 
are composites that have two sides to them, a physical side and a non-
physical one. And of course psychophysical dualism does not require one 
to believe that the connection between the two sides is an accidental or 
even unnatural connection, that it is anything like, say, the connection 
between two more or less incompatible horses hitched together. The body-
soul connection, though metaphysically contingent, obtains naturally by 
natural necessity, and only a supernatural act of God can uphold, once a 
human being has died, the existence of the subject of action and experience 
                                       
13  Cf. again van Inwagen (1997), 246. 
14  For more, see Meixner (2004); (2005). 
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which together with a certain human body constituted that human being 
when alive.15 
This said, it must not go unmentioned that there is, nevertheless, a cer-
tain impediment confronting the classical, dualistic account of resurrection. 
This impediment is located in the theological tradition. When describing 
the classical account of resurrection, I deliberately left it open whether the 
human body Y is or is not (numerically) identical with the human body X – 
X being the body of which the relevant subject of action and consciousness 
was once the soul, Y being the body of which it becomes the soul at the 
resurrection. Obviously, if it is asserted that Y is identical with X, then all 
the advantages that the classical, dualistic account of resurrection has over 
the materialistic account are nullified; for all the difficulties that confront 
the materialist account will then also confront the classical account. So, in 
order to hold on to the advantages of the classical, dualistic account, one 
ought to complete that account by asserting that Y is not identical with X, 
that Y is a truly new body, which assertion does, of course, not preclude 
that Y is in many respects very similar to X (say, like the body of Jesus af-
ter his resurrection was similar to his body before the resurrection). But the 
trouble is that by asserting the numerical difference of Y and X one is con-
tradicting ecclesiastical authorities, for example Thomas Aquinas, who 
explicitly asserts that the body a human being is resurrected with is nume-
rically identical to the body the human being has now (and will die with): 
Ad hoc quod homo idem numero resurgat, necessarium est quod partes eius 
essentiales sint eaedem numero. Si igitur corpus hominis resurgentis non erit ex 
his carnibus et his ossibus ex quibus nunc componitur, non erit homo resurgens 
idem numero. (S. c. G., IV, 84.) 
                                       
15  Note that, according to the present account, the manner of the constitution (or com-
position) of a human being from body and soul is not hylemorphic, since, according 
to it, a soul cannot well be regarded as the form of a body or of a quantity of matter. 
However, since according to Christian hylemorphism (as developed by Thomas 
Aquinas) the rational soul of a human being is an immaterial individual substance 
that can exist without the body, Christian hylemorphism, too, is a form of psycho-
physical dualism. Note, moreover, that the present account is not per se Cartesian 
(in the full sense), since it is left open whether the human body is a substance (see 
Section 2). Descartes himself, though, required decidedly less for being a substance 
than is here required (see Section 1). 
Uwe Meixner 38
How should one position oneself in this matter? I have argued that, on 
the basis of the Christian faith, it is not reasonable to identify the continu-
ous link between the human being that died and the human being that is 
resurrected entirely or even only in part with his or her body, existing con-
tinuously from death to resurrection. Adopting such a position is not reaso-
nable because it is likely to make resurrection impossible for many human 
beings, perhaps for all human beings, since it simply does not seem to be 
the case that their bodies exist continuously from death to resurrection.16 
Now, Thomas Aquinas, for one, was very well aware that the bodies of 
some human beings do not continuously exist from death to resurrection, 
but, instead, believed that unequivocally the same human being – and with 
that same human being the same human body – can be reconstituted by 
God from the still existing identical individual matter that was once in the 
human body during the time it was first alive, by reuniting that matter – or 
rather, part of it – to the still existing identical soul: 
[A]nima rationalis, quae est hominis forma, manet post mortem ...; materia etiam 
manet, quae tali formae fuit subiecta, sub dimensionibus eisdem ex quibus habe-
bat ut esset individualis materia. Ex coniunctione igitur eiusdem animae numero 
ad eandem materiam numero, homo reparabitur. (S. c. G., IV, 81.) 
Suppose, however, what is not unlikely at all: that even all this matter is 
destroyed, that it is transformed into energy in the nuclear cauldron of a 
new sun that swallows the earth. What then of resurrection?17 
                                       
16  Peter Geach makes appeal to the heroism of faith “against strong empirical objec-
tions”: “The traditional faith of Christianity, inherited from Judaism, is that at the 
end of this age Messiah will come and men rise from their graves to die no more. 
That faith is not going to be shaken by inquiries about bodies burned to ashes or 
eaten by beasts.” See: Geach (1997), 234. Indeed, the faith of, say, Peter van In-
wagen in resurrection is not shaken, even though he, as a Christian materialist, be-
lieves, and must believe, “that it is absolutely impossible, even as an accomplish-
ment of God, that a man who has been burned to ashes or been eaten by worms 
should ever live again.” See: van Inwagen (1997), 245. Van Inwagen’s faith is he-
roic: we have seen what it costs him. But, to me, his heroism seems misplaced. A 
lot less of heroism, and a little more of fairness to dualism, is what I would recom-
mend (if asked). 
17  Note, however, that Thomas is not in the difficulty that is posed by Peter van In-
wagen’s thought experiment (described above), since for Thomas – being a Chris-
tian dualist, and not a Christian materialist – there is, besides the ingredient of iden-
tical matter and its identical disposition in space, a second – and entirely non-
arbitrary – ingredient to the identity of a human being (and the identity of a human 
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I therefore conclude that Thomas Aquinas is in error regarding resurrec-
tion: the body of the resurrected human being is not numerically the same 
body as the body it died with. And this conclusion is corroborated by the 
Gospel: While the resurrected Jesus is undoubtedly the same human being 
as the Jesus who died – the Gospel is entirely clear on this – the body of 
the resurrected Jesus does certainly not seem to be numerically the same 
body as the body of the Jesus who died, though indeed the former body is 
in many respects – regarding outward appearance – very similar to the lat-
ter body, and perhaps in fact continuous with it (in the sense that the first 
body continuously changed into a second body, numerically different from 
the first). Consider merely the ability of the body of the resurrected Jesus 
to appear suddenly out of thin air, and to disappear as suddenly into it. It is 
surprising that Thomas completely disregards this aspect of the body of the 
resurrected Jesus when discussing the (general) nature of the bodies of the 
resurrected (see S. c. G., IV, 84), while according great emphasis to the 
fact that that body could be touched and consisted of flesh and bones. To 
me, it seems quite clear that the body of the resurrected Jesus has a differ-
ent nature than the body of the Jesus who died, and what has different na-
tures cannot be numerically identical. 
In adopting this position against the authority of Thomas, I am sup-
ported by Joseph Ratzinger, alias Benedict XVI, the current Pope. In his 
Einführung in das Christentum he writes (my translation): 
Paul [St. Paul] teaches, to repeat, not the resurrection of bodies, but of persons, 
and this emphatically not in the return of the “flesh-bodies,” that is, of the bio-
logical structures, which [return] he explicitly calls impossible (“what is mortal 
cannot become immortal”), but in the otherness of the life of resurrection, as it is 
paradigmatically modeled in the resurrected Lord.18 
 
                                                                                                                         
body): the identical soul (which is both forma hominis and forma corporis hu-
mani). Thomas was quite aware that there is, due to the flux of matter through a 
human body, a certain arbitrariness in allowing matter to be an identity-maker for 
human beings; this awareness comes out quite clearly in the following quotation: 
“[N]on requiritur ad hoc quod resurgat homo numero idem, quod quicquid fuit ma-
terialiter in eo secundum totum tempus vitae suae resumatur: sed tantum ex eo 
quantum sufficit ad complementum debitae quantitatis; et praecipue illud resumen-
dum videtur quod perfectius fuit sub forma et specie humanitatis consistens.” (S. c. 
G., IV, 81.) 
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